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Lindsey R. Baden, MD, Otto O. Yang, MD, David C. Christiani, MD, MPH, Gustavo Mostoslavsky, MD, PhD,
David V. Diamond, MD, Elizabeth Gilman Duane, MS, RBP, CBSP, Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP,
Thomas Winters, MD, Jeffrey A. Gelfand, MD, Gary Fujimoto, MD,
T. Warner Hudson, MD, and Jatin M. Vyas, MD, PhDLearning Objectives
 Become familiar with the potential harms associated with
exposure to lentiviral vectors (LVVs).
 Summarize the authors’ proposed framework for researchers,
institutional safety committees, and occupational health
professionals relevant to LVVs.
 Discuss the authors’ recommendations for dealing with LVV
exposures, including the supporting evidence.Lentiviral vectors (LVVs) are powerful genetic tools that are being used with
greater frequency in biomedical laboratories and clinical trials. Adverse
events reported from initial clinical studies provide a basis for risk assess-
ment of occupational exposures, yet many questions remain about the
potential harm that LVVs may cause. We review those risks and provide
a framework for principal investigators, Institutional Biosafety Committees,
and occupational health professionals to assess and communicate the risks of
exposure to staff. We also provide recommendations to federal research and
regulatory agencies for tracking LVV exposures to evaluate long-term out-
comes. U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved antiviral drugs for HIV
have theoretical benefits in LVV exposures, although evidence to support
their use is currently limited. If treatment is appropriate, we recommend
a 7-day treatment with an integrase inhibitor with or without a reverse
transcriptase inhibitor within 72 hours of exposure.
M ost lentiviral vectors (LVVs) are derived from the humanimmunodeficiency virus (HIV) type 1 and retain the ability
to integrate into the genome of infected cells.1 Integrating DNA into
the genome of host cells is a powerful technique that allows
scientists to manipulate genes and gene expression.2,3 This tech-
nology is used both at the laboratory bench to answer fundamental
questions in biology and in the clinic to provide potential cures to
genetic diseases and alter the function of cells that are delivered to
patients (eg, chimeric antigen receptor T-cells).4 However, this
powerful tool also carries the potential to cause oncogenic, infec-
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JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016The oncogenic potential of LVVs can manifest through
multiple mechanisms. LVV-infected cells can become cancerous
through activation of oncogenes or inactivation of tumor suppressor
genes. Insertional mutagenesis results from gene dysregulation at
the site of LVV integration within or near a coding region of the host
genome. Such integration can cause outright gene disruption or
overexpression of normal cellular genes due to insertion of a
nonphysiologic promoter. Another pro-oncogenic mechanism is
gene transduction of an oncogenic transgene. In addition, designed
LVVs can target multiple genes and regulatory pathways simul-
taneously (eg, libraries of shRNA or CRISPR sgRNA), which could
effectively silence or inactivate tumor suppressor activity. Finally,
the unknown functions of some transgenes may promote onco-
genesis or other toxic effects. Oncogenic changes created by these
mechanisms will be carried by the infected cell and its progeny.
Another concern of LVVs derived from HIV is the possibility
that recombination unintentionally reconstitutes a replication-com-
petent and pathogenic virus. The design of LVV constructs has
evolved to increase the carried transgene size and reduce the risk of
developing a replication-competent virus (Fig. 1).5 The identifi-
cation of HIV genes not required for integrating the transgene has
permitted the engineering of the multiple-attenuated packaging
systems.6,7 In second-generation LVVs, four accessory genes, vif,
vpr, vpu, and nef, are removed without major negative effects on
vector yield or infection efficiency (Fig. 1C).6,8,9 These modifi-
cations also improve LVV safety, as any lentivirus that becomes
replication-competent would be devoid of these virulence factors.
Therefore, first and second-generation LVVs reduce, but do not
eliminate the probability of creating pathogenic replication-com-
petent viruses. The design of LVVs is further refined in the third and
fourth generations by separating the genes necessary for creating the
LVVonto additional plasmids (Fig. 1D and E).10,11 Moreover, some
vectors include self-inactivating sequences that significantly reduce
expression from the viral promoter after integration.5,12 This design
has substantially reduced, but not eliminated the risk of uninten-
tionally generating replication-competent viruses.13
Still, this design does not eliminate the risks of insertional
mutagenesis and the intrinsic risks associated with the transgenes
inserted by the viral vector. Risk of exposure that promotes infection
in a research worker is mitigated in the laboratory by eliminating the1159
FIGURE 1. The development of LVV packaging systems from
HIV. A, Wild-type HIV genome with all of its genes and
regulatory elements provides the backbone for LVVs. B,
First-generation LVVs removed the envelope protein and the
psi packaging signal and incorporated a heterologous pro-
moter to reduce recombination potential. C, Second gener-
ation of LVV removed accessory genes (vif, vpr, vpu, and nef) to
reduce the virulence of any potential replication-competent
retrovirus. D, Third-generation LVV eliminated the transacti-
vator gene, tat, and split the vector into three plasmids to
reduce further recombination potential, retaining only the
three genes necessary for transgene expression (gag, pol,
rev). E, Fourth-generation LVV split the gag and pol onto
separate plasmids to reduce even further recombination
potential. This generation added back some HIV genes to
enhance transduction efficiency and transgene expression.
Schlimgen et al JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016use of sharps wherever feasible, and implementing extrinsic bio-
containment strategies and personal protective equipment (PPE).
Moreover, experimental procedures can be modified to reduce the
concentration and volume of LVV to minimize the impact of a
potential exposure. In this paper, we review the potential risks
associated with LVV exposure and provide recommendations for
principal investigators (PIs), Institutional Biosafety Committees
(IBCs), and occupational health professionals to prevent and pre-
pare for potential exposures, including guidelines for LVVexposure
response plans. We also provide recommendations to federal
research and regulatory agencies for tracking LVV exposures in
order to evaluate long-term outcomes.1160  201RISKS OF LENTIVIRUS AND TRANSGENE
EXPOSURES
LVVs are designed to deliver and integrate genes into the
genome of a cell and are being tested clinically to treat genetic
disorders and endow cells with specific functions.14 These trials
have provided some evidence of the risks associated with viral
vectors. In two early gene therapy trials, 20 children with X-linked
severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) were treated using
Moloney murine retrovirus-derived vectors, a viral vector that
integrates into host DNA, similar to LVVs. Of those 20 children,
five individuals developed leukemia due to insertional mutagene-
sis.15 Indeed, Moloney murine retrovirus-derived viral vectors have
different integration profiles than HIV, the backbone for LVVs.
Additional studies support a link between viral vector systems and
oncogenesis. In the first study, two of 10 patients with X-linked
SCID developed uncontrolled exponential clonal proliferation of
mature T cells, presumably due to retrovirus vector integration in
proximity to the LMO2 proto-oncogene promoter.16 In the second
study, one of 10 patients treated with a murine gamma-retroviral
vector to correct X-linked SCID developed clonal T cell acute
lymphoblastic leukemia (T-ALL) as a result of insertional muta-
genesis.17 Together, these studies show that modified murine leu-
kemia viruses present a high risk of leukemogenesis as a result of
their powerful enhancer sequences located in the intact LTR regions.
In another study, two patients who underwent lentiviral treatment
for X-linked chronic granulomatous disease progressed to myelo-
dysplasia (15 months postinfusion) or acute myeloid leukemia (28
months postinfusion), due to insertional activation of oncogenes and
silencing of tumor suppressor genes.18 Finally, a patient treated with
LVV for beta-thalassaemia developed a nonmalignant, clonal
expansion of erythroblasts due to integration of a LVV transgene
into the HMGA2 locus.19 This expansion was limited to erythro-
blasts presumably because of the tissue specificity of the b-locus
control region used to drive expression of the b-globin gene. It is
unknown at this time if the clone will remain homeostatic or serves
as a prelude to oncogenic transformation.19 Thus, LVVs can cause
clonal expansion and may cause oncogenesis through insertional
mutagenesis when given purposely in high doses with the intention
to modify DNA of human subjects. And, there is a potential risk of
accidental insertional mutagenesis for an individual inadvertently
exposed to LVV engineered for research purposes.
The potential risks from LVVs are dependent upon the nature
of the exposure. LVVs are derived from blood-borne pathogens that
generally require direct contact with either blood or mucous mem-
branes to initiate infection. In the laboratory, the majority of
exposures to LVVs occur by direct contact with intact skin. As
with HIV, exposure to intact skin is not clinically relevant and does
not pose a significant risk. The preferred method to respond to this
exposure is copious washing of the affected area with running water
to dilute, cleanse, and flush the LVVs from intact skin. There is no
indication for postexposure chemoprophylaxis for an intact skin
exposure. Clinically relevant exposures result through parenteral
inoculations, contact with the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose,
or mouth, or through direct contact with nonintact skin. The best
methods to prevent exposure are proper technique, training, and
personal protection equipment. This will include carefully review-
ing the use of sharps in laboratory procedures and eliminating them
when possible: for example, plastic substitutes for glass Pasteur
pipettes are commercially available. Needle/syringes should not be
used.20
Indirect contact with droplets or smaller airborne particles
may occur in the laboratory setting. Aerosol exposures through
droplet transmission are another potential route of LVV exposure.
The NIH Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Commit-
tee (HICPAC) defines droplet transmission as an indirect contact6 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016 Risks and Recommendations for LVV Exposuresroute that results from infectious agents depositing on susceptible
mucosal surfaces of the recipient, generally over short distances. In
contrast, HICPAC defines airborne transmission as the dissemina-
tion of infectious agents in the respirable size range that remain
infective over time and distance.21 Aerosol-generating procedures
(such as centrifuging or pipetting) with LVVs can generate droplets
that are generally 5 to 10mm in diameter.22 These droplets will fall
out of the air in 15 to 67minutes. Pedrosa and Cardoso23 have
shown a 30% penetration of 5mm particles to the alveoli and 50%
penetration of 10mm particles to the tracheobronchial region. There
is no significant penetration of particles 20mmor greater beyond the
trachea. There have been no documented cases of airborne trans-
mission of HIV in clinical laboratories handling patient specimens;
however, droplet transmissions have been reported.24
These data support treating droplet contact with mucous
membranes (droplet transmission), but not airborne transmission,
as a clinically relevant exposure. In addition, as LVVs are often
designed to infect a broader range of human cells than HIV [eg,
replacing the HIVenvelope with vesicular stomatitis virus envelope
glycoprotein (VSV-G)], the entire mucosal membrane of the
tracheobronchial region can potentially be infected. Thus, droplet
transmission poses a risk hazard and aerosol-generating procedures
with LVVs should be performed in primary containment (ie, bio-
safety cabinet or sealed centrifuge rotors). In summary, clinically
relevant LVV exposure is limited to individuals who have experi-
enced (1) direct parenteral inoculation, (2) contact with mucousFIGURE 2. Mechanism of nucleic acid delivery by LVVs. Viral particl
LVV RNA into the cell. Reverse transcription converts the LVV RNA to
by the infected cell. After integration, the cell can become canc
genesis. Reverse transcription can be blocked by NRTIs [nucleos(t
can be blocked with HIV integrase inhibitors. Illustration by Nico
 2016 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicinmembranes or nonintact skin, or (3) direct contact at a close range
to droplets from an aerosol-generating procedure outside of
primary containment.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
Use of antiretroviral drugs has extended from primary treat-
ment of HIV infection to postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) for high-
risk exposure. Considering the potential risks of LVVs versus the
generally favorable safety profiles of newer anti-HIV drugs, we
recommend that occupational health professionals consider offering
PEP after a clinically relevant LVVexposure following a discussion
with the exposed individual of the risks and benefits of antiretroviral
therapy. Although there are no direct data to support this recom-
mendation, we believe that experience with HIV PEP provides some
guidance. Ideally, the laboratory staff, the PI, and the occupational
health professionals should review the LVVs being used and
develop a laboratory-specific exposure response plan before an
exposure incident (see Appendix 1 for a sample exposure response
plan.) This exposure plan should be available to the responding
clinician when a clinically relevant exposure occurs. Review and
approval of such research is often a function of the IBC. Knowledge
of the LVVs being used and an established exposure response plan
allow involved staff to consider carefully the risks and benefits of
PEP. If the decision is made to treat an exposed individual, there are
no data to support a specific regime or duration of prophylaxis.es containing lentiviral RNA fuse to the target cell, releasing the
DNA, which integrates into the host genome and is expressed
erous through LVV transgene expression or insertional muta-
)ide reverse transcriptase inhibitors] and LVV DNA integration
le Wolf, MS, 2016. Printed with permission.
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Schlimgen et al JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016However, on the basis of the basic biology of LVVs, we recommend
the use of an integrase inhibitor with or without a reverse transcrip-
tase inhibitor. There are no data regarding the optimal number of
drugs for PEP, but given the theoretical risks of LVVexposure versus
the small but concrete risks of antiretroviral drugs, some favor
single-drug PEP with the integrase inhibitor (which has the best
safety profile).
An examination of the HIV infection cycle reveals why some
current antiretroviral treatments would potentially treat LVV
exposures (Fig. 2). Current antiretroviral drugs for HIV infection
include nucleos(t)ide reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs),
nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs), protease
inhibitors, fusion inhibitors, entry inhibitors (CCR5 coreceptor
antagonist), and HIV integrase strand transfer inhibitors. Of these
treatments, only NRTIs and HIV integrase strand transfer inhibitors
act upon pathways retained in LVVs, and other drug classes would
provide no benefit for PEP. LVVs are usually pseudotyped with a
heterologous envelope protein, thus eliminating HIV-1 specific
entry and fusion inhibitors as effective therapies. LVVs do not
contain genes for replication and expression of the Gag pre-protein,
thus viral protease inhibitors would not be effective.
The discussion between the occupational health professional
and the exposed individual should include the potential risks of
insertional mutagenesis and oncogenesis, emphasizing that there
have been no definitive case reports of such harm from occupational
exposures. However, these adverse effects may be difficult to detect
because they may appear years after the exposure and be masked as
a naturally occurring cancer. The conversation should also note that
the proposed treatment is based on accepted HIV PEP guidelines
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,25 and dem-
onstrated to reduce the risk of HIV infection (the parent virus) after
exposure, but has not been clinically proven to prevent insertional
mutagenesis from an integrated LVV. This discussion should be
balanced with the inherent risks of antiretroviral medications.
Current therapies have a tolerable side effect profile and are
currently prescribed prophylactically to healthy individuals at a
high risk for HIV exposure [pre-exposure exposure prophylaxis
(PrEP)].26 The risk tolerance of the exposed individual is a critical
factor in the decision to treat, as the benefits of PEP are unknown at
this time. If a decision is made to treat the individual with anti-
retroviral PEP, we recommend a 7-day treatment with an integrase
inhibitor with or without a NRTI to commence as soon as possible
postexposure but within 72 hours of exposure (Table 1). Current
PEP for occupational HIV exposure recommends 28 days of treat-
ment,25 but there are important differences between LVVs and HIV.
Both third and fourth-generation LVVs have a low risk of creating a
replication-competent virus in contrast to HIV, which is intrinsically
replication-competent. Second, only the first round of integration
for LVVs poses risk. However, as LVVs cannot replicate, the risk
beyond integration is thought to be very low. Integration should take
place within hours of exposure, so longer treatments beyond 7 days
may not provide additional benefits. Finally, more drugs are gener-
ally chosen for HIV PEP because the drug resistance profile is
generally unknown, and there are significant rates of single and even
double drug class resistant viruses in circulation.25TABLE 1. Proposed Lentiviral Vector Postexposure Prophylaxis
Initiation of treatment 0–72 hours after exposure
Duration of treatment 7 days
Types of treatment Integrase inhibitor—eg, raltegravir
With or without
Nucleoside reverse transcriptase
inhibitor (NRTI)—eg, tenofovir
1162  201Treatment should be started as soon as possible, as the primary
goal of therapy is to prevent the LVV integration event. Maximum
benefitwould be theoretically achieved if treatment is started immedi-
ately or within 2 hours. After 72hours, there is likely no benefit to
treatment, as any LVVs present in the individual will have either
entered the cell or have been cleared. As a quick response is para-
mount to treatment, it is advisable to start treatment and then dis-
continue rather than delay initiation of treatment. Because it is
foreseeable that the risk-benefit discussion will often be protracted,
we strongly recommenddeveloping an exposure response plan during
the IBC review and experimental design discussion.
For most LVV exposures, an integrase inhibitor (eg, rale-
gravir or dolutegravir) with or without a NRTI (eg, tenofovir) could
be considered. The integrase inhibitors have an increasingly accept-
able safety and tolerability profile in the treatment of HIV infection.
Tenofovir is also considered generally safe and well-tolerated (used
extensively for HIV and HBV treatment) but can result in neph-
rotoxicity and an extremely rare risk of fatal lactic acidosis. Before
using these medications, an assessment for pre-existing HIVor HBV
infection should be made to minimize the chances of inducing
antiviral resistance. Both an integrase inhibitor and a NRTI are
components of recommended first-line therapies for HIV and HIV
PEP.25,26 In appropriate cases, we recommend the use of these drugs
with the understanding that they have not been approved for these
indications by the FDA. The short duration of treatment reduces the
risk for side effects. However, when determining the risk tolerance
of the exposed individual, single drug therapy should be considered
if there is a contraindication to one of the drug classes. Drug
combinations are used for HIV PEP to prevent and circumvent
possible pre-existing viral drug resistance25; however, resistance is
not a significant concern for LVVexposure because nearly all LVVs
use a native HIV-1 backbone, which should be fully drug suscept-
ible. Thus, the benefit of using multiple drugs to treat LVV clinically
relevant exposure is unclear, but would theoretically derive from the
additive benefit of each drug alone.
Occupational health programs should develop a baseline
LVV exposure response plan that could be initiated quickly when
an exposure incident is reported. The baseline LVVexposure control
plan should be maintained at the institution. In addition to a baseline
exposure response plan, a laboratory-specific protocol should be
developed with the help of the IBC, the institutional Biosafety
Officer (BSO), and the PI that considers details of LVVs used in the
laboratory. This effort will require the IBC to identify all regis-
trations and laboratories that use LVVs and provide the relevant
information to occupational health programs. This information and
decision criteria for modifying an exposure response plan will be
discussed in more detail in the next section. The laboratory-specific
exposure response plan, depending upon the organizational struc-
ture of the institution, may be best kept by the PI in the laboratory,
the BSO, the IBC, and/or in the occupational health program. Thus,
when an individual arrives at occupational or employee health clinic
reporting an LVV exposure incident, the first step would be to
identify the laboratory-specific response plan. If this is not readily
accessible, the default institutional response protocol could be
initiated in the first 2 hours, while the laboratory-specific plan is
located (or developed) and the ongoing PEP modified accordingly.
In situations wherein an institution does not have an occupational
health clinic/provider, guidance on management of these exposures
should be generated by the institution and given to the affected
laboratory worker to present to the Primary Care Physician or
Emergency Department personnel.
Finally, there is no ‘‘right’’ approach for treating LVV
exposure as treatment currently employed for laboratory exposures
range from no treatment to administration of antiretrovirals. The
uncertainty stems from being unable to quantify the potential risk of
insertional mutagenesis from LVV exposure. It balances the LVV6 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016 Risks and Recommendations for LVV Exposuresrisks against the risks and theoretical benefits of treatment. Occu-
pational health professionals should use caution when presenting
the potential benefits of PEP treatment, but not dismiss the potential
risks associated with LVV.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL
BIOSAFETY COMMITTEES
The IBC has two important roles to ensure the safety of the
laboratory staff and clinicians working with LVVs. First, the IBC is
responsible for assuring that the PI understands and communicates
the risks to laboratory personnel who work directly with the
biological materials. Second, the IBC acts a source of information
for occupational health professionals during an exposure incident.
This information can be formalized in an exposure response plan
and should be included in a biological safety/IBC registration.
Developing an exposure response plan should be a joint effort
between the PI, BSO, occupational health, and the IBC. Moreover,
the inclusion of occupational health professionals on the IBC (either
as voting members or as ex-officio members) can strengthen this
relationship and ensure that the IBC provides the necessary infor-
mation to the health care provider evaluating the exposed individual.
The modern biological laboratory comprises many individuals who
work outside traditional hours (ie, 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM). Exposed
laboratory workers often have incomplete information about the
critical details of the LVV to make timely clinical decisions.
Following an exposure incident, the PI should be able to provide
critical information regarding the nature of the LVV. When the PI is
unavailable, the BSO or IBC contact can relay this critical infor-
mation to the occupational health clinic. Therefore, the IBC needs to
collect critical information about the use of LVVs from the PI before
an incident occurs. Further, the IBC must ensure that the PI is aware
of the risks associated with LVVs and has developed an LVV
exposure response plan that is readily available in the event of
an exposure. Ideally, the exposure response plan should be readily
available in the laboratory for any exposed researcher to access and
present to a clinical facility for postexposure evaluation and
possible treatment.
IBCs should also require PIs, as part of the review and
approval process of LVV registrations, to develop laboratory-
specific exposure response plans. Investigators should reach out
to their institutional BSO and occupational health professionals to
assist with developing the laboratory specific LVV exposure
response plan. These plans should be provided in a succinctTABLE 2. Information to Help the Risk Assessments of Viral Vecto
Information Provided to IBC Low-risk E
Transgene function Protein-based fluoresce
Number of plasmids used to generate virions 3–4 plasmids
Mutations within LVVs LVVs that use self-ina
terminal repeats (L
deleterious mutatio
Expression control elements Weak promoters
Host range Nonhuman tropism
Concentration <1 x 109 infectious uni
Production volume <100mL
Percentage of genome deleted or substituted >2/3
Vector name pCI-VSVg, pRSV-Rev,
Name and provider of the transgene or target
sequence
Commercial (Addgene
Site of generation (eg, laboratory, core facility,
or commercial provider)
PI’s laboratory, institut
 2016 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicindocument that includes at least the following information. First,
it should include the appropriate work practice controls and PPE for
procedures involving LVVs. Second, the plan should outline the
actions an exposed individual and their PI should take in immediate
response to the different types of LVVexposure. For example, in the
event of an ocular exposure, the eye (s) should be flushed at an eye-
wash station for 5 to 15minutes. Third, the plan should include
contact information for the institution’s occupational or employee
health clinic and instructions to report within 2 hours of an exposure.
In addition, it should be emphasized that antiretroviral drugs may
be offered to individuals exposed to LVVs who meet the definition
of a clinically relevant exposure. However, the final decision to
offer antiretrovirals will be determined by potential risk of the
exposure, a clinical determination made by the occupational health
professional. Finally, in consultation with occupational health
professionals, the IBC, and the PI, drug treatments may be listed
in the exposure response plan that are specific to the LVV being used
in the laboratory that considers the origin of the vector and transgene
(s) being carried by the vector.
Once the information is collected and laboratory-specific
exposure response plan developed, the PI or supervisor should discuss
potential risks with every individual in the laboratory working with
LVVs. The discussion should include each element of the laboratory-
specific exposure response plan. The PI should emphasize that PEP
may be offered to the individual by occupational health personnel in
the event of a clinically relevant exposure. The IBC should obtain
written verification from the PI that they have adequately described
the exposure response plan to each individual in their laboratory and
that individuals working with LVVs understand that PEP may be
offered after a clinically relevant exposure. Similar protocols should
be followed in animal facilities that use LVVs.
The NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or
Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines) require that PIs
receive IBC approval of all LVV work before their use in animal
models, and at a minimum, PIs notify the IBC of all LVVwork before
their production or use in immortalized cell lines.27 In institutions that
do not receive federal funding, it is best to follow these federal
guidelines. There is a range of information that institutions currently
require PIs to providebefore IBC reviewandapproval.To identify and
categorize the risk of the LVVs, we recommend that IBCs require
investigators to submit detailed information concerning the viral
vector being used in the laboratory as well as the nature of the
transgene inserted into the LVV, as denoted in Table 2.rs
xamples Clinically Relevant Examples
nce (eg, GFP) Silence a tumor-suppressor or express an
oncogene (ie, Ras, Myc, etc.)
2 or less plasmids
ctivating long
TRs) and other
ns
Wild-type LTRs
Strong promoters present (CMV, SV40,
etc.)
Expanded host range (ie, VSV-g)
ts/ml >1 x 109 infectious units/ml
>100mL
<2/3
pMD2.G, etc.
, etc.) or Academic (Scientific Collaborator or Core Facility)
ional core facility, or commercial provider
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Schlimgen et al JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016This information is critical for the IBC and for occupational
health professionals in order to counsel and treat an exposed
individual. The name and provider of the target sequence identifies
the transgene and allows the risks associated with the transgene to be
reviewed by the IBC. The function of the transgene, if known, is
important for determining whether the transgene has inherent
oncogenic potential. The vector name and type is important, especi-
ally identifying the generation of LVV, as some vector backbones
are by design resistant to therapeutic drugs and may modify the PEP
offered to exposed individuals deemed eligible for antiretroviral
therapy. Identification of expression control elements will highlight
strong and weak promoters and enhancers that may indicate higher
risk. Host range is also important, as many LVVs are pseudotyped
with VSV-g to allow for transduction of a broad range of
mammalian cells.28 Using an envelope protein with a narrow host
range and tissue specificity will reduce the risk associated with LVV
exposure. High concentration (greater than 1 109 infectious units/
mL) increases the risks of exposure when compared with lower
concentrations.2 In addition, working with large volumes of LVVs
(greater than 100mL) produces a higher risk. There are higher risks
associated with the process of generating LVVs than using them in a
transduction assay, so knowledge of the site of generation will
identify those individuals at a higher risk. Finally, not only stating
the percentage of viral genome present in an LVV is required by the
NIH Guidelines27 but also serves as a check for determining the
LVV generation: third and fourth-generation LVVs should have less
than two-thirds of the HIV viral genome.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL RESEARCH
AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
If an individual is exposed to a LVV, state and local govern-
ments may require notification. At the federal level, the NIH Office
of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) must be notified of all overt
exposures to recombinant and synthetic nucleic acid molecules from
all institutions that receive federal funding.27 The federal govern-
ment records the incident only and specifically avoids recording the
name of the exposed individual. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) require all blood-borne pathogen
exposures from needle sticks and cuts from sharps be recorded by
the employer on the OSHA Log of Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses (OSHA Form 300). Thus, the only entity tracking and
following up with exposed individuals is the institution itself.
NIH OBA incident reports are required to include a descrip-
tion of the nature, cause, and consequences of the exposure incident.
The institution completes a report that includes the measures that it
took in response to mitigate the root cause of exposure and prevent
reoccurrence. The institution needs to identify the PI as well as any
medical surveillance provided or recommended after the incident
and if there was an injury or illness associated with the incident.
OSHA regulations do not explicitly mention lentiviruses, but could
potentially cover exposure incidents through the Bloodborne Patho-
gens (BBP) Standard, the recording criteria for needle stick and
sharps injuries (29 CFR Section 1904.8), and the general duty clause
(29 USC Section 654).20 The general duty clause of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act requires each employer to ‘‘furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.’’29 Only
the BBP Standard offers any specific requirements for handling
human source materials, while the other standards and regulations
provide justifications for investigations, fines, and corrective actions
after an incident has been reported and investigated by OSHA.
Collecting and tracking information from individuals to
evaluate the long-term risks associated with lentiviruses is currently
managed by the institution. This is a difficult task for most institu-
tions. First, there may not be an immediate host response to an1164  201exposure. Long latency health effects are more difficult to trace back
to an exposure occurring years before and may create a false sense
of risk avoidance. Second, the individuals most likely to be exposed
to LVVs are a highly mobile population of undergraduate students,
graduate students, postdoctoral scientists, technicians, nurses, and
research physicians who are not likely to stay with the laboratory or
the institution for the 10 to 20 years necessary to observe possible
signs and symptoms of the exposure. Third, there is no standard
method or guidance for institutions to collect and track information
about exposure incidents, so the information is not uniformly
collected, stored, or analyzed.
Occupational exposure registries are one method to track
potential long-term effects of exposure to LVVs. Surveillance
registries of workers who are occupationally exposed to LVVs
may be helpful in determining the incidence and prevalence of
any potential adverse effects from LVV exposure incidents. Occu-
pational exposure registries have been used to track workers
exposed to ionizing radiation, asbestos, beryllium, and toxins from
theWorld Trade Center disaster.30 In addition, the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Nanotechnology
Research Center (NTRC) supports epidemiologic studies for nano-
material workers, including medical, cross-sectional, prospective
cohort, exposure studies, and exposure registries.31,32
We recommend that the federal government through either
the CDC or OBA establish a registry to follow LVV-exposed
individuals and support epidemiologic studies for scientific
researchers working with lentiviruses, including medical, cross-
sectional, prospective cohort, and exposure studies to assess any
long-term effects of lentivirus exposures.
CONCLUSION
Preventing exposures to LVVs is an important element in
occupational health and biosafety programs. Incident reports should
capture details on the procedure being conducted; this allows review
of the prevention efforts. Most exposures involve intact skin and can
be handled with flushing of affected area with copious amounts of
water. Other clinically relevant exposures that merit consideration
for antiretroviral prophylaxis include (1) direct parenteral inocu-
lation; (2) contact with mucous membranes or non-intact skin; and
(3) direct contact at a close range to droplets from an aerosol-
generating procedure outside of primary containment. Treatment of
LVVs exposure poses difficult questions because of the need to
balance potential risks with these medications that carry inherent
risks and potential benefit to prevent infection with LVVs. To
address these difficult questions, we propose a three-pronged
approach to treatment of LVVs.
The IBC, PIs, and personnel working with LVVs should
weigh the risks and potential benefits of treating clinically relevant
exposure incidents before the event. IBCs should provide the
support, guidance, and training to the PI so that they can have
discussions with their staff at the time of experimental design when
the decision is made to use these powerful genetic tools. Upon
approval, the IBC should include recommendations for offering or
deferring PEP, with rationale based on the risk of material. This
information should be recorded in the registration under the occu-
pational medicine section. Occupational health providers and
laboratory personnel should then weigh these risks to determine
an individual’s preference for treatment if an exposure was to occur.
If the decision is made to treat an exposure, an immediate
short course of an integrase inhibitor and NRTI can be used as PEP.
The federal government should track and collect information
from LVV-exposed individuals to evaluate the long-term risks
associated with lentiviruses, as they are uniquely suited to collect
this information.
As we learn more about the long-term effects of LVV
exposure, hopefully through federal exposure monitoring, and as6 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
JOEM  Volume 58, Number 12, December 2016 Risks and Recommendations for LVV Exposuresthe treatments for retrovirus exposures progress, the balance
between the potential risks of insertional mutagenesis and the side
effects of treatments will shift. As the risk of exposure is better
defined, it may be determined that there is no benefit to treating
exposures. And conversely, as the antiviral treatments become better
tolerated with fewer side effects, the decision to treat may be
strengthened. Either way, the topic should be revisited in the future
to determine the best course of action for such exposures.
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ERP for a Lentiviral Vector System to Induce c-Raf
Expression
Laboratory-Specific Lentivirus Exposure Response
Plan
Biological Agent Information
Lentiviral vectors are single-stranded RNA viral vectors
derived from the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that retain
the ability to integrate into the genome of infected cells.
Vector System
11pRSV-Rev (packaging Vector)
 pLKO.3G (transfer Vector, eGFP marker)
 pMD2.G (VSV-g envelope vector)
 293T Human Cell line
Transgene Information
 c-Raf (an oncogene that is part of the cellular growth pathway)
 Mutants of c-Raf with unknown function
Risks of Exposure
 Insertional mutagenesis—the lentiviral vector can disrupt the
normal regulation of cell development and proliferation leading
to oncogenesis. Transgene oncogenesis—the transgene is an oncogene and may
induce oncogenesis in infected cells. Generation of replication-competent retrovirus—the lentiviral
vector may undergo a series of low probability events to revert
to a replication-competent retrovirus.
Routes of Transmission
 Direct parenteral inoculation
 Contact with mucous membranes or nonintact skin
 Direct contact at a close range to droplets from an aerosol-
generating procedure outside of primary containment66  201Response
6 AIntact Skin Exposure: immediately wash off the affected area
with copious amounts of running water to dilute, cleanse, and
flush the LVVs from intact skin. Nonintact Skin Exposure: immediately wash the exposed area
with copious amounts of soap and water to dilute, cleanse, and
flush the LVVs from the area. Mucous Membrane Exposure [Eye(s), Nose, or Mouth]:
immediately flush the area with running water for at least
15 minutes. Droplet Exposure: see above based upon the area exposed
First Aid Treatment
 Call emergency personnel if immediate medical care is needed
(911)
 Stabilize the individual and provide first aid for injuries that
require immediate medical care (eg, deep cuts, bleeding, etc.)
Postexposure Prophylaxis Based upon discussion before the incident, the following treat-
ments may be offered.
 As soon as possible but within 72 hours, initiate a 7-day course
of a NRTI (such as tenofovir) and an integrase inhibitor (such
as raltegravir or dolutegravir).
 Observation and treatment of overt effects of the exposure
incident.meIf no prior discussion about treatment has occurred, treatment
with tenofovir and raltegravir/dolutegravir should be considered
and begin within 72 hours and continued based upon a discussion
and acceptance of the risks and benefits of treatment.
Reporting Incident
 All exposure incidents should immediately be reported to the
principal investigator, the Biosafety office, or Occupational
Health. All exposures to biological agents should be reported to the
Institutional Biosafety Committee. If the exposure results in an overt exposure to recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules will be reported to the NIH
Office of Biotechnology Activities All sharps accidents will be reported on the OSHA Log of Work-
Related.rican College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
